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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
SCOTT C. WADS WORTH, : Case No. 20100004-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated 
SUMMARY 
According to the dictates of the Sixth Amendment guarantees and the principles 
that that flow from that right, the trial court had a duty, once it was informed of the 
confusion regarding private counsel, to assess Wadsworth's indigency status and inform 
him of his right to assignment of counsel rather than incorrectly asserting he would be 
forced to represent himself at trial or be incarcerated pending trial. However, the trial 
court failed to make such an inquiry to ensure Wadsworth's Sixth Amendment rights 
were not violated and there was no evidence that Wadsworth was no longer indigent. 
Instead, the trial court's erroneous declaration forced Wadsworth to believe he had to 
choose to either proceed to trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he had lost 
confidence in or represent himself with facing the possibility of incarceration. Because 
the trial court violated Wadsworth's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and choice of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
counsel, Wadsworth plea was involuntary and the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea was erroneous. 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAD A DUTY TO INFORM MR. WADSWORTH OF 
HIS RIGHT TO ASSIGNMENT OF COUNSEL AFTER BEING INFORMED OF THE 
DIFFICULTIES AND CONFUSION SURROUNDING PRIVATE COUNSEL AND 
VIOLATED THE SIXTH AMENDMENT BY THREATENING THAT WADSWORTH 
WOULD REPRESENT HIMSELF UNLESS HE "STRAIGHTENED OUT" THE 
PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATE COUNSEL. 
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court violated the Sixth 
Amendment when it threatened Mr. Wadsworth that unless he "straightened out" the 
problems and confusion with his representation by private counsel he would be 
representing himself at trial where he faced over twenty felony charges and two class A 
misdemeanors. Rl-8. Despite the State's suggestions to the contrary, there is no evidence 
that Wadsworth did not remain indigent after retaining private counsel. Under the Sixth 
Amendment, the trial court had a duty to inform Wadsworth regarding his right to the 
assignment of legal counsel to represent him if he remained indigent. U.S. Const, amend. 
VI; Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302(1) (2008) (Utah's Indigency Defense Act ("the Act")). 
Instead, the trial court erroneously informed Wadsworth that he faced the possibility of 
representing himself at trial which violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
right to choice of counsel. See id. Mr. Wadsworth relied on the trial court's incorrect 
assertion to his detriment by continuing with private counsel the trial court knew 
Wadsworth had lost confidence in. 
"An accused is entitled to employ counsel of his choice, and if indigent and unable 
to obtain his own counsel, he is entitled to representation by a court-appointed attorney." 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986); Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 
530 (Utah 1978) (same). In this case, it is undisputed that at Wads worth's initial 
appearance in December 22, 2003, the trial court found him indigent and appointed Salt 
Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) to represent him. R10-12, 13-14, 15. On 
December 30, 2003, Wadsworth retained private counsel and LDA withdrew from 
representation. The State erroneously argues that "any . . . error in not re-advising 
Defendant of the right to appointed counsel would be harmless because the record is clear 
that [he] could afford to retain counsel." Appellee Brief 18-19. However, there are a 
multitude of reasons that a defendant who has been found indigent may have the ability 
to hire private counsel but "despite [a defendant's] ability to retain private counsel, he 
[may still] remain indigent." State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, Tf9, —P.3d—. 
For example, in the consolidated appeal of State v. Parduhn, each of the 
defendants were found to be indigent and appointed a public defender but nevertheless 
eventually hired private counsel to represent them. Id. In Mr. Parduhn's case, he 
"received a one-time monetary gift from his grandparents that he used to retain private 
counsel." Id ^ 5. Though the reasons for Mr. Jeffs' and Mr. Davis' ability to retain 
private counsel are not stated, they, like Parduhn, were found by the trial court to have 
remained indigent despite their ability to retain private counsel. Id 1fl[8-9, 11-12. 
Similarly, despite Wadsworth's ability to retain private counsel, there is no evidence 
establishing he was no longer indigent, and the trial court had an ongoing duty to make 
"[a] determination of indigency or continuing indigency" especially in light of the initial 
finding early on in the proceedings. Utah Code Ann. §77-32-302(1) (2008) ("A 
3 
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determination of indigency or continuing indigency of any defendant may be made by the 
court at any stage of the proceedings."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302 (3) ("The court 
may make a determination of indigency at any time."). 
In accordance with the dictates of the Sixth Amendment, Utah's Indigency 
Defense Act offers additional support for the trial court's duty to assess Wadsworth's 
indigency status and inform him of his right to assignment of counsel rather than 
incorrectly asserting Wadsworth would be forced to represent himself at trial. See 
Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^|18, —P.3d — (Court "unwilling to disregard 
controlling authority that bears upon the ultimate resolution of a case solely because the 
parties did not raise it below"). In response to decisions by the United States Supreme 
Court holding that the "right to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel." State v. 
Burns, 2000 UT 56, ffi[23, 24, 4 P.3d 795, the Act was enacted "[t]o ensure compliance 
with the requirements that indigent defendants receive effective assistance of counsel and 
'access . . . to the basic tools of [a] defense'" throughout a criminal proceeding. Parduhn, 
2011 UT 55,1(19. 
To ensure compliance with the Sixth Amendment requirements, the Act mandates 
that defendants who have been found indigent be assigned legal counsel and "access to 
defense resources necessary for an effective defense" in cases where there is a 
"substantial probability" that the penalty imposed would be prison. Utah Code Ann. § 77-
32-302(1) (2008). Under the Act, the mandate to assign counsel or resources can be 
accomplished in two ways: (1) "the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or 
both; or" (2) "the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense resources, 
4 
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or both and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the record the 
opportunity to be represented and provided defense resources." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-
302(l)(a)&(b) (2008); State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, Tfl9, —P.3d— (same). 
Contrary to the State's assertion, "compliance with the requirements [of the Sixth 
Amendment] that indigent defendants received effective assistance of counsel" including 
choice of counsel, does not require the defendant to make a request. Parduhn, 2011 UT 
55,1J19; State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Appellee Brief 12-19. 
Rather, the trial court can "on its own motion . . . order[] counsel" and a defendant must 
"affirmatively waive [or reject on the record] the opportunity to be represented and 
provided defense resources." Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, Iff 19, 63 (citing the Act). This is not 
simply a case where defendant did not request the assignment of counsel once problems 
arose with retained counsel, but a case where the trial court knew of the confusion but 
affirmatively told Wadsworth that unless he "straightened out" the problems with private 
counsel's representation he would be "representing [him]self." R192:8. The trial court 
also threatened that if Wadsworth did not resolve the issue with counsel before trial, it 
would "just make the determination that Mr. Wadsworth's not cooperating with his 
attorneys and I'll take him into custody and he'll [sit] in jail until we try the case." 
R192:9. 
By the time of the August 6, 2004 motion hearing, where the State asked for a 
continuance due to the prosecutor having left the state and the case manager being unable 
to attend trial, Wadsworth had lost confidence in Mr. Warren's ability to represent him at 
trial against the serious felony charges. R43-44;l 15; 192. Mr. Warren explained that after 
5 
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the May 7, 2004 hearing, Wadsworth told him that "it was his intention to as least seek a 
second opinion and retain other counsel." R192:3. Due to the breakdown in the 
relationship with Mr. Warren, Wadsworth paid Ms. Susanne Gustin $5,000 to, according 
to his understanding of the fee agreement, represent him through the remainder of the 
trial proceedings. R.99, 115-16; 119. The trial court stated that Ms. Gustin told him "she 
was never retained to represent him in this case." R192:3. 
However, Mr. Warren explained to the court that it was also his understanding, 
after talking with Ms. Gustin that she had been retained to represent Wadsworth. R192:3-
4. Later Mr. Warren received a telephone call from Ms. Gustin telling him that she had 
been unsuccessful in contacting Wadsworth. R192:4. Although Mr. Warren had not been 
in contact with Wadsworth since early May, he wrote to Wadsworth asking him to let 
him "know what was going on" because "[i]t was [Mr. Warren's] understanding that [he] 
was going to be replaced as [Wadsworth's] attorney." R192:4. Mr. Warren repeated again 
to the court that this was his understanding about Ms. Gustin. R192:5. 
Although Mr. Warren expressed his belief that Ms. Gustin had been hired to 
replace him and that he had no contact with Wadsworth until 36 hours before the August 
6th hearing, Mr. Warren entered a stipulated motion to continue on July 20th stating a 
different purpose for Wadsworth hiring of Ms. Gustin. R43-44; 192:4. Wadsworth 
explained to the court that he retained Ms. Gustin for $5,000, in late May and had signed 
a retainer agreement. R192:5; 115-16; 119-20. The trial court asked Wadsworth "[w]here 
is she?" "If she's representing you, I don't see her here." R192:5. Wadsworth explained 
the discrepancy in Ms. Gustin's representation stating that Ms. Gustin told him a month 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
earlier that because of her pregnancy she would not "be able to go to trial" on the date it 
was scheduled. R192:6. Wadsworth stated he was not originally aware that Ms. Gustin 
was pregnant and asked her "why didn't you tell me that to begin with?" R192:6. 
Wadsworth asked "what am I going to do?" R192:6. | 
Ms. Gustin then told Wadsworth she would not be able to represent him but she 
would give him the names of her associates, but she never called Wadsworth back. 
R192:6. Wadsworth stated he talked with Ms. Gustin a day or so after receiving her June 
17th letter and asked to "see the evidence" against him. R192:7. Ms. Gustin told him that 
she had to get a hold of the prosecutor but "that was the last that I heard from her." 
R192:7. Wadsworth waited for Ms. Gustin to call him because "that's what we were 
going to do and as the time grew near" he contacted her again. R192:7. Several days 
before the August 6th hearing, Wadworth called Ms. Gustin and told her that court was in 
a few days and wanted to know what they were going to do. R192:6. Wadsworth stated 
"I'm kind of left hanging here and really I paid her a hefty fee and retained her for things 
that we had agreed upon and she was supposed to contact [the prosecutor].. .over a 
month ago because I wanted to look at some evidence . . . against me, and she never 
called me back again after that point." R192:6. 
Wadsworth expressed confusion over the situation stating "I don't know why 
she's saying I haven't retained her. She's been paid in full." R192:7-8. The court then 
told Wadsworth "I don't know, but you better get it straightened out." R192:8. 
Wadsworth stated that he wanted to and Ms. Gustin was supposed to call him back. 
R192:8. The court then threatened "You better do more than want to or you'll be here 
7 
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representing yourself." R192:8. Wadsworth told the court "I don't want to do that." 
R192:8. The court then granted the State's continuance and reset the trial date to October 
26,2004.R192:8 
At the end of the hearing, Mr. Warren made a motion for leave to withdraw as 
Wadsworth's counsel. R192:8. The trial court denied the motion stating: 
Mr. Wadsworth had some arrangement in this case and I'm not letting you 
out of this case until Ms. Gustin or somebody else makes an appearance 
because I'm not continuing this [inaudible] but anybody down here on the 
22nd or the week before so I know we can't try this because I don't have a 
lawyer. Or if that's the case, I'll just make the determination that Mr. 
Wadsworth's not cooperating with his attorneys and I'll take him into 
custody and he'll set [sic] in jail until we try the case. Do I make myself 
clear? 
R192:9 (emphasis added). 
"When a defendant is forced to stand trial 'with the assistance of an attorney with 
whom he has become embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict,' he is deprived of the 
'effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever' and his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is violated." State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Rather 
than the trial court making threats that Wadsworth would have to represent himself at 
trial or be locked up in jail until the case is tried, it had a duty to inquire about the 
dissatisfaction that Wadsworth expressed regarding Mr. Warren's representation and 
whether the situation required the court's assistance in procuring substitution of counsel 
to ensure the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. Id. at 273. When 
addressing a trial court's duty regarding the substitution of appointed counsel, this Court 
has stated: 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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[W]hen dissatisfaction is expressed, the court must make some 
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the 
defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to 
determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed 
attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel would be violated but for substitution. Even when the trial judge 
suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely 
to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory 
questioning is not sufficient. 
Id (citing United States v. Weltry, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d. Cir. 1982)). 
The trial court never made such an inquiry here to ensure Wadsworth's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and choice of counsel were not violated by being forced to 
continue to trial with Mr. Warren after it had been made clear to the court that 
Wadsworth had lost confidence in his ability. Rl 15-16; 168:14; 192:3-4; State v. 
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, «|74, 63 P.3d 731 (holding that '"[a] defendant cannot be forced to 
proceed with incompetent counsel'" (citation omitted)). In fact the trial court 
acknowledges that there was "confusion" regarding the scope of representation Ms. 
Gustin agreed to and its refusal to allow Mr. Warren to withdraw as counsel "unless new 
counsel appeared." R125. The trial court's memorandum decision also notes that it put 
the onus on Wadsworth to "resolve his concerns regarding representation before the 
October trial setting, because the Court would not be inclined to continue the matter once 
again." Rl 25. 
The State concedes that the record is clear that Wadsworth did not want to 
represent himself against these serious charges at trial. Appellee Br. 15. Despite being 
informed of Wadworth's desire to be represented by counsel and the court's awareness of 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the confusion and problems that existed with private counsel, the trial court issued 
Wadsworth an ultimatum rather than inform him of his right to assignment of counsel. 
The record supports that Wadsworth in good faith believed he had paid for Ms. Gustin to 
represent him during the trial proceedings. Not only did Wadsworth believe Ms. Gustin 
represented him but Mr. Warren expressed his belief that Ms. Gustin had taken over the 
case and Mr. Warren sought to withdraw. Despite the confusion regarding the scope of 
Ms. Gustin's representation, it is clear that Wadsworth no longer desired to have Mr. 
Warren represent him against these charges. 
However, due to this confusion and the trial court's ultimatum to either resolve the 
concerns regarding private counsel before the October trial or Wadsworth would be 
representing himself and faced the possibility of being held in custody, Wadsworth was 
left with the impression that Mr. Warren must continue to represent him if he desired 
counsel. After paying Ms. Gustin $5,000, Wadsworth did not have the funds to retain 
alternative counsel. R168:13. The trial court never made any effort to inform Wadsworth 
of his right to assignment of counsel and there is no evidence that Wadsworth was no 
longer indigent. The trial court's erroneous declaration in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment forced Wadsworth to believe he had to choose to either proceed to trial with 
the assistance of an attorney with whom he had lost confidence in or represent himself 
while facing the possibility of being incarcerated. State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270, 274 
(UtahCt.App. 1987). 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WADSWORTH'S MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE IT WAS SHOWN THAT HIS PLEA 
WAS INVOLUNTARY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-6 AND RULE 11, UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The trial court's denial of Wadsworth motion to withdraw his guilty plea was 
erroneous where it was shown that his plea was not voluntarily made because Wadsworth 
was led to believe that he must either go to trial represented by an attorney with whom he 
had lost confidence in or represent himself against the serious felony charges. Appellant 
OB 43-47. The trial court was aware that Wadsworth had lost confidence in Mr. Warren's 
ability to represent him and confusion existed on who would represent him at trial, yet the 
trial court did not make any reasonable efforts to determine whether the confusion and 
Wadsworth's relationship with counsel had been resolved and he was entering his plea 
voluntarily in accordance with Rule 11(e) and Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (2008). Based 
on the violation of the Sixth Amendment, Rule 11 and the statutory provision, this Court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of Wadsworth motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Because "'[t]he entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several important 
constitutional rights' and 'because the prosecution will generally be unable to show that it 
will suffer any significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted." State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT 
App 121, Ifl 1, 210 P.3d 955. Although "[t]he State maintains that this 'liberal' standard 
for guilty pleas is no longer valid," this Court was not persuaded by the State's arguments 
asking the Court to remove the "liberally granted" language for its opinion in its petition 
for rehearing. Id., YP 6-23. In this case, Wadsworth made a timely motion to withdraw 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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his guilty plea based on the Sixth Amendment violation and the State admitted they 
would suffer little if any prejudice if the trial court granted Wadsworth motion, therefore 
the trial court erred in failing to liberally grant his motion. Rl68:29. 
"The purpose of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know their rights and 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." State v. Dean, 2004 
UT 63, ^ [9, 95 P.3d 276. Rule 11 provides one procedural mechanism to support a plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily made as required under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2008) 
by requiring the trial court to find the "detailed and specific criteria have been fulfilled." 
State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991). But even if this Court were to find that 
rule 11 was strictly complied with, the violation of Wadsworth's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel and choice of counsel prohibits a finding that his plea was voluntary under the 
controlling statute. See Patterson, 2011 UT 68, [^18 (court "unwilling to disregard 
controlling authority that bears upon the ultimate resolution of a case"). 
"To be valid, a guilty plea must be a 'knowing, intelligent act[ ] done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'" United 
States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 580, 592 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). Where a defendant has pled guilty after being denied his right to 
choice of counsel, he may have been provided constitutionally inadequate counsel for 
entry of a voluntary plea. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) 
("Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed 
to result in prejudice."); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 n.6 ("an intelligent assessment of the 
relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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[counsel] . . . a guilty plea to a felony charge entered without counsel and without waiver 
of counsel is invalid.5'); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1). 
In Brady, the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's guilty plea as voluntary "even 
though the law promised him a lesser maximum penalty if he did not go to trial" 
reasoning "the possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could . . .be dissipated 
by the presence and advice of counsel." Brady, 397 U.S. at 754. Comparing the case to 
Miranda, it held '"[t]he presence of counsel'" is "'the adequate protective device 
necessary' to counteract the coerciveness of'police interrogations.'" Smith, 640 F.3d at 
592 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 754 n.12). "Where there has been a breakdown in 
communication between defendant and defense counsel such that the mounting of an 
adequate defense would be impossible, this 'protective device' is absent." Smith, 640 
F.3dat592. 
"An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and 
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the 
defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very 
real sense, it is not his defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975) (emphasis 
added); U.S. v. Smith, 640 F.3d 580, 590 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[T]o compel one charged with 
grievous crime to undergo trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has 
become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance 
of any counsel whatsoever.")(citation omitted)). Under these circumstances, the plea 
would not be voluntary. 
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Because Wadsworth was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and right to 
choice of counsel by the trial court erroneously informing him that he would have to 
represent himself at trial if he did not get the problems with private counsel straightened 
out, or face incarceration, his guilty plea was rendered involuntarily and this Court should 
reverse. See Point I. 
CONCLUSION 
As more fully set forth in the Opening Brief, Appellant, Scott C. Wadsworth, 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
SUBMITTED this & day of January, 2012. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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